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NEW LIFE FOR THE AGENCY THEORY:
Commissioner v. Bollinger, 108 S. Ct. 1173 (1988)
LINDA J. GRIFFITHS
N 1949, the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of
whether a nominee corporation which is holding title to property
for the benefit of its shareholders can be a nontaxable agent.' In Na-
tional Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner,2 the Court set forth the cir-
cumstances that must be present before an agency relationship will be
recognized for tax purposes.' Although the Supreme Court declared
that an agency relationship between a corporation and its shareholders
is possible,4 courts in subsequent cases rarely found a "true" agency
relationship to exist.' In contemporary cases dealing with this issue,
the Fourth and Fifth Circuits interpreted the National Carbide test
very strictly; under their interpretation, a closely held corporation
would likely never meet the criteria. 6 In 1986, a conflict between the
circuits arose when the Sixth Circuit determined that the National
Carbide test should be interpreted more liberally.7
In Commissioner v. Bollinger,8 the Supreme Court revisited the
agency question for the first time to resolve the conflict between the
circuit courts. 9 Affirming the Sixth Circuit, the Court held that if a
written agency agreement is executed at the time the property is ac-
quired, the corporation functions as agent for all purposes relating to
the property, and the corporation is represented solely as an agent in
1. See National Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner, 336 U.S. 422 (1949).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 437. Although the Court in National Carbide determined that no agency relation-
ship existed, it preserved the possibility that such a relationship could exist by setting forth a six-
factor test which became the standard for subsequent agency cases. For a complete discussion of
National Carbide and the six-factor test, see infra notes 73-81 and accompanying text.
4. National Carbide, 336 U.S. at 437.
5. See, e.g., Ourisman v. Commissioner, 760 F.2d 541 (4th Cir. 1985); Roccaforte v.
Commissioner, 708 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1983); Jones v. Commissioner, 640 F.2d 745 (5th Cir.
Mar. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981); Harrison Property Management Co. v. United
States, 475 F.2d 623 (Ct. Cl. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1130 (1974); Collins v. United States,
386 F. Supp. 17 (S.D. Ga. 1974), aff'd, 514 F.2d 1282 (5th Cir. 1975).
6. See Ourisman, 760 F.2d at 541; Roccaforte, 708 F.2d at 986.
7. See Bollinger v. Commissioner, 807 F.2d 65, 69-70 (6th Cir. 1986), aff'd, 108 S. Ct.
1173 (1988).
8. 108 S. Ct. 1173 (1988).
9. Id. at 1175.
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dealings with third parties, the relationship satisfies agency require-
ments for tax purposes.10
The pro-taxpayer decision in Bollinger is a victory for real estate
developers who must resort to the corporate form to secure financing
for their projects. State usury laws often restrict the rate of interest at
which a noncorporation may borrow, so the type and amount of fi-
nancing a developer needs may only be available at the higher corpo-
rate lending rate." To avoid this problem, the individual or
partnership can form a corporation to obtain the loan, but prior to
Bollinger, they risked incurring undesirable tax consequences.' 2 The
decision in Bollinger allows developers to avoid state usury laws
through the use of closely held corporations, while enjoying as indivi-
duals the tax benefits that flow from the property.
This Comment will discuss the dilemma that traditionally faced tax-
payers who used closely held corporations to hold title to property. It
will trace the development of the two major theories taxpayers ad-
vanced in trying to resolve that dilemma. It will examine the case law
leading to the conflict between federal circuit courts of appeals and
the resolution by the Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Bollinger.
Finally, this Comment will analyze the impact of Bollinger on subse-
quent cases and discuss the ramifications of this decision.
I. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
A number of reasons unrelated to federal income taxation may
compel a property owner to have someone else hold record title to his
or her property. For example, the property owner may wish to avoid
mortgage liabilities, remain anonymous, simplify conveyance of the
property, or avoid title complications which can arise upon death. 3
Although an individual may serve as a title holder, such an arrange-
ment presents problems that can be avoided by the use of a nominee
corporation, sometimes called an "agent corporation," "conduit cor-
poration," "dummy corporation," "shell corporation," or "straw
corporation."1 4 Unlike an individual, a corporation has perpetual life,
10. Id. at 1179.
11. See infra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 24-31 and accompanying text.
13. Kurtz & Kopp, Taxability of Straw Corporations in Real Estate Transactions, 22 TAX
LAW. 647, 647 (1969).
14. Although different courts and authors have sometimes used the terminology inconsis-
tently, for the purposes of this Comment the term "nominee corporation" will refer to a closely
held corporation which is holding naked legal title for a sole stockholder, a partnership, or a
corporation, which will be referred to as the beneficial owner.
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so it cannot create title problems by dying. 5 An individual's marital
difficulties can also create title problems, a danger absent in the cor-
porate arrangement. 6 In addition, the liabilities of one property can
be insulated from the liabilities of another by using a separate corpo-
ration for each. 7 Finally, a corporation can be kept impecunious, and
its officers can execute all documents and be easily replaced if the
need arises."
Nominee corporations are also useful for avoiding state usury laws.
Usury laws, which have existed in America since its colonial days, 9
establish a maximum rate of interest on loans, and were developed to
protect borrowers from unscrupulous lenders. 20 Often a borrower and
lender do not enter into the loan agreement on "an equal footing,"
and the usury statutes attempt to prevent the exploitation of needy
borrowers by capping the interest that lenders can charge. 21
Most states, perhaps viewing the corporation as better able to pro-
tect itself than an individual, have some provision permitting busi-
nesses to borrow at a higher rate.22 Thus, when a real estate developer
is unable to secure financing in compliance with the limit imposed by
the state's usury law, the developer may resort to a corporate nomi-
nee. 23 In this way, the developer secures the necessary financing while
retaining control over the property.
However, the tax consequences often make such an arrangement
unattractive when the developer wants the tax attributes arising from
the operation of the property reflected on his or her individual, rather
than the corporation's, tax return. Because the tax benefits and bur-
dens generated by property generally belong to its "owner," 24 devel-




19. Morris, Consumer Debt and Usury: A New Rationale for Usury, 15 PEPPERDINE L.
REv. 151, 163 (1988).
20. K. BROWN & K. KEEST, USURY AND CONSUMER CREDIT REGULATION §§ 1.1-.2 (1987).
21. Id. § 1.2.
22. Id. § 9.1.1, at 203; see, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 360.025 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
1989).
23. In fact, the lender may require the developer to use a corporate nominee. Hoffman,
Straw or Nominee Corporations Must Be as Passive as Possible to Protect Investors Deductions,
5 TAx'N FOR LAW. 10, 11 (1976); see, e.g., Commissioner v. Bollinger, 108 S. Ct. 1173, 1178
(1988).
24. See Bollinger, 108 S. Ct. 1173, 1176 (1988); Cliff & Levine, Reflections on Ownership-
Sales and Pledges of Installment Obligations, 39 TAx LAW. 37, 37 (1985); Note, Tax Aspects of
the Nominee Corporation: Roccaforte v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 22 TULSA L.J. 61,
61 (1986). But see Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376, 378 (1930) ("taxation is not so much con-
cerned with the refinements of title as it is with actual command over the property taxed-the
19891
130 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LA WREVIEW [Vol. 17:127
opers create problems when they use a nominee corporation to hold
title to their property. 25 Since the corporation is holding title, the tax
law may recognize the corporation as the "owner" and require it to
treat the income as its own. 26
Generally, individuals want income and losses from property attrib-
uted to themselves, rather than to a corporation. When income gain is
attributed to a corporation, it is first subject to a corporate tax before
being passed on to shareholders through dividends; the shareholders
then must pay tax on the dividend, resulting in a double taxation. 27
Furthermore, unless a corporation can meet the requirements for S
Corporation status, 28 corporate deductions cannot pass through to the
shareholders. 29 Since nominee corporations usually do not have in-
come against which to offset losses, the deductions may be perma-
nently lost.3 0 However, courts have generally reasoned that since the
beneficial owners chose the corporate entity as the most advantageous
means of conducting their business, they must also accept the undesir-
able tax consequences that follow, and thus have attributed income
and losses to the corporation.3
actual benefit for which the tax is paid"); Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner, 544 F.2d 1045,
1049 (9th Cir. 1976) ("depreciation is not predicated upon ownership of property but rather
upon an inve.tment in property" (citations omitted) (emphasis in original)); Bolger v. Commis-
sioner, 59 T.C. 760 (1973); Gladding Dry Goods Co., 2 B.T.A. 336 (1925) ("The important
question is . . .who made the investment of the capital which is to be recovered over the period
of the exhaustion of the property. The one who made the investment is entitled to its return.").
Bolger presents an especially interesting case because the court rejected both the disregard and
agency arguments, but nonetheless awarded the depreciation deductions to the taxpayer. 59 T.C.
at 767, 770-71.
25. See, e.g., Bollinger, 108 S. Ct. at 1176 ("The problem we face here is that two different
taxpayers can plausibly be regarded as the owner.").
26. See Note, supra note 24, at 61-62.
27. I.R.C. §§ 11, 61(a)(7), 301, 316(a) (1988); Rands, Organizations Classified as Corpora-
tions for Federal Tax Purposes, 59 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 657, 659 (1985); Bertane, Tax Problems
of the Straw Corporation, 20 VILL. L. REv. 735, 737 (1975). By contrast, partnerships are not
subject to double taxation. I.R.C. § 701 (1988) (individual partners, rather than partnership,
subject to income tax).
28. An S corporation is one which is taxed "in the same manner as in the case of an indi-
vidual," with a few exceptions. I.R.C. § 1363(b) (1988). S corporations generally avoid double
taxation as well. See id. §§ 1366-1368. For detailed instructions on the restrictions and require-
ments for electing S corporation status, see I. SCITuEBER & S. TRAMu, SUBCHAPTER S: PLANNING
& OPERATION (1983).
29. Rands, supra note 27, at 659-60; Baker & Rothman, Nominee and Agency Corpora-
tions: Grasping for Straws, 33 INsT. ON FED. TAx'N 1255 (1975); Bertane, supra note 27, at 737.
By contrast, partnership losses pass through to individual partners. I.R.C. § 702(8) (1988) (part-
ners must account separately for their distributive share of partnership income and losses).
30. I.R.C. § 172(b) (1988) (limiting "Net Operating Loss Carrybacks and Carryovers");
Rands, supra note 27, at 1264; Baker & Rothman, supra note 29, at 1264; Bertane, supra note
27, at 737.
31. See Commissioner v. National Alfalfa Dehydrating & Milling Co., 417 U.S. 134, 149
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II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE THEORIES
Taxpayers tried two approaches in attempting to avoid the unfavor-
able tax consequences of using a nominee corporation to hold record
title to property. In the first approach, known as the disregard theory,
the corporate entity is ignored completely; the argument is that the
corporation has no tax identity distinct from its shareholders. Under
this theory, the courts analyze the activities of the corporation to de-
termine whether the corporation is totally without substance and
should therefore be disregarded for tax purposes.3 2
The second approach recognizes the existence of the corporation,
but posits that the corporation is merely acting as the nominee or
agent of its shareholders, who are the beneficial owners. The problem
taxpayers have traditionally faced under this theory is proving they
have a true agency relationship with the corporate nominee. The
courts look for the presence of a number of factors to determine
whether a true agency relationship exists.33
The two theories overlap to some extent. Many cases combined ele-
ments of both, particularly during the early development of the theo-
ries.34 Additionally, the theories were argued in the alternative in
several cases,35 although some commentators have opined that the two
theories lend. no support to each other, and serve only to weaken the
stronger argument when presented together.3 6
A. The Disregard Theory
The disregard theory first found support in Southern Pacific Co. v.
Lowe,37 when the Supreme Court held that income earned by a
wholly-owned subsidiary prior to the effective date of the Income Tax
(1974); see also Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436, 439 (1943) ("The choice
of the advantages of incorporation to do business ... require[s] the acceptance of the tax disad-
vantages." (citing Burnet v. Commonwealth Improvement Co., 287 U.S. 415 (1932))).
32. See infra notes 37-67 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 68-81 and accompanying text.
34. See, e.g., Jackson v. Commissioner, 233 F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1956); Palcar Real Estate
Co. v. Commissioner, 131 F.2d 210 (8th Cir. 1942); United States v. Brager Bldg. & Land Corp.,
124 F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1941); Sheldon Bldg. Corp. v. Commissioner, 118 F.2d 835 (7th Cir.
1941); see also Miller, The Nominee Conundrum: The Live Dummy is Dead, but the Dead
Dummy Should Live!, 34 TAx L. RaV. 213, 232-36 (1979).
35. See, e.g., Robert D. Wray, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 1849-81 (1978) (taxpayer arguing both
theories); Aldon Homes, Inc. v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 582 (1959) (Commissioner arguing both
theories).
36. See, e.g., Comment, Corporate Agents and the Flow-Through of Tax Advantages, 12
SETON HALL L. REV. 798, 799 n. 17 (1982). But see infra note 198 and accompanying text.
37. 247 U.S. 330 (1918).
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Act of 1913 would be treated as that of its parent corporation .3 The
theory underlying the decision was that the two corporations could be
treated as identical "because of the complete ownership and control"
the parent exercised over its subsidiary.3 9 However, this case is gener-
ally regarded as unique, and not as standing for the proposition that a
corporation can be disregarded for tax purposes.4
The first major case relying on the disregard theory was Burnet v.
Commonwealth Improvement Co. ,4 in which a corporation sold stock
to its sole shareholder and claimed a loss on its income tax return. The
corporation was wholly owned by the estate of a decedent, who had
set up the corporation and transferred the stock to avoid multiple
death duties and ensure the safety of a charitable endowment. Upon
audit, the Commissioner determined that the sale actually produced a
gain for the corporation, not a loss. The corporation contested the
Commissioner's finding, 42 and alternatively argued that it realized "no
true loss or gain' ' 41 on the sale because it and the shareholder were the
same entity. The corporation did not propose that any time a corpora-
tion engages in a transaction with its single shareholder, the transac-
tion should be disregarded, but rather that the court should look
beyond mere form to regard the substance of the transaction. Under
its own facts, the corporation claimed that "there was really no in-
come, nothing properly taxable as such." 44 The Court, however, re-
jected the corporation's argument, finding that the two entities were
separate and distinct, having been recognized as such for years and
taxed accordingly.45
In 1943, the Supreme Court handed down what has become the
controlling case in this area. In Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner,46 a sole stockholder organized Moline Properties, Inc. (Moline)
to give greater security to a creditor. Under the arrangement, the
shareholder conveyed property and mortgages to the corporation in
exchange for all but the qualifying shares of stock, which he then
38. Id. at 330, 335-39 (citing Income Tax Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114, 166).
39. Id. at 337.
40. See National Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner, 336 U.S. 422, 427-29 (1949); Moline
Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436, 439 (1943); Burnet v. Commonwealth Improve-
ment Co., 287 U.S. 415, 420 (1932).
41. 287 U.S. at 415.
42. Since the corporation had not contested the Commissioner's method of reckoning in the
lower courts, the Supreme Court did "not undertake to determine what was not considered be-
low." Id. at 418.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 419.
45. Id. at 417-20.
46. 319 U.S. 436 (1943).
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transferred to a voting trustee appointed by the creditor. After five
years, control of the corporation reverted to the shareholder when he
paid off the creditor and refinanced the mortgages. During this five-
year period, the corporation assumed a financial obligation the share-
holder owed to the creditor, defended several condemnation proceed-
ings, and sued to remove restrictions imposed on the property by a
prior deed. After the corporation sold its holdings, it transacted no
further business, but was not dissolved. Moline sought to have the
gain realized on the sale of the property recognized on the sharehold-
er's individual return, arguing that the corporation should be ignored
as merely fictitious. 47
In rejecting Moline's argument, the Court focused on the corpora-
tion's status as a separate entity with "a tax identity distinct from its
stockholder. ' 48 The Court stated that so long as the purpose served by
the corporate entity "is the equivalent of business activity or is fol-
lowed by the carrying on of business by the corporation, the corpora-
tion remains a separate taxable entity."' 49 The Court emphasized that
because the corporation was never dissolved after the discharge of the
original debt, it stood ready to again serve the business interests of the
shareholder. In fact, Moline had again mortgaged its property, dis-
charged that mortgage, sold the property, and filed income tax returns
reflecting those activities. At one time, it had also leased part of the
property as a parking lot for a substantial rental. Such activity com-
pelled the Court to conclude that the corporation had its own distinct
tax identity.50
Moline also attempted to argue the agency theory, but the Court
summarily dismissed the argument in the absence of an actual con-
tract of agency and the usual incidents of an agency relationship. 1
The Court stated that "the mere fact of the existence of a corporation
with one or several stockholders, regardless of the corporation's busi-
ness activities, does not make the corporation the agent of its stock-
holders."52
Cases following Moline focused on what has been dubbed the
"business purpose" or "business activity" test. Basically, courts will
47. Id. at 436-38.
48. Id. at 440.
49. Id. at 439. This statement has become known as the "separate entity doctrine" and
continually appears as a policy concern throughout the agency cases.
50. Id. at 440.
51. Id. This dicta would later be read as approving the use of the agency theory under the
right circumstances. See, e.g., Ourisman v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 171, 185-86 (1984), rev'd,
760 F.2d 541 (4th Cir. 1985).
52. Id.
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recognize the corporation as a separate taxable entity if either a busi-
ness purpose or business activity is present. The courts have inter-
preted this language very broadly, finding a business purpose behind
almost every reason for incorporating." A finding that a corporation
is doing business does not necessarily depend on the amount of busi-
ness activity,5 4 and in fact, "[tihe degree of corporate purpose and
activity requiring recognition of the corporation as a separate entity is
extremely low." 5
This broad interpretation of the business purpose test made it ex-
tremely difficult for a corporation to be disregarded. For example, in
Paymer v. Commissioner5 6 taxpayers formed two corporations to pro-
tect their assets from a possible lawsuit. The corporations each held
title to income-producing property, but had no offices, kept no books
or bank accounts, and collected no income. One corporation did
nothing with respect to the property held in its name, and the court
declared it "a sham to be disregarded for tax purposes." 57 But the
other corporation obtained a loan and assigned the lender "all the
lessor's rights, profits and interest in two leases on the property and
covenanted that they were in full force and effect and that it was the
sole lessor." 58 The court found that single transaction sufficient to sat-
isfy the business activity test and declared the corporation a separate
taxable entity.5 9
The nominee corporation in Evans v. Commissioner6° also engaged
in limited activity, which the court similarly found sufficient to recog-
53. The major exceptions appear to be where the Commissioner is asserting that the corpo-
ration was formed merely for tax avoidance, see Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935);
Aldon Homes, Inc. v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 582 (1959), or where the corporation is a complete
sham, see Davis v. Commissioner, 585 F.2d 807 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 981
(1979); Haberman Farms, Inc. v. United States, 305 F.2d 787 (8th Cir. 1962); see also Harrison
Property Management Co. v. United States, 475 F.2d 623, 626 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (corporation can-
not be ignored "if it is more than a pure sham"), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1130 (1974).
54. Britt v. United States, 431 F.2d 227, 235, 237 (5th Cir. 1970).
55. Strong v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 12, 24 (1976), aff'd, 553 F.2d 94; see also Britt, 431
F.2d at 237 (business activity required for recognition of corporation as separate entity may be
minimal). But see Kimbrell v. Commissioner, 371 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1967), in which the court
disregarded two nominee corporations that had executed contracts, hired employees, negotiated
loans and collected the interest. Id. at 901. The court characterized the activities as "empty
gestures" and the corporations as "being merely depositories or donees of [the taxpayer's] in-
come." Id. at 902. Note, however, that the Commissioner, rather than the taxpayer, argued the
disregard theory in this case. See id. at 901 n. 11. Thus, Kimbrell parallels other cases in which
the Commissioner argues that the corporations are a sham designed to evade taxation. See supra
note 53.
56. 150 F.2d 334 (2d Cir. 1945).
57. Id. at 337.
58. Id. at 336.
59. Id. at 335-37.
60. 557 F.2d 1095 (5th Cir. 1977).
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nize the corporation as a separate taxable entity. In Evans, an individ-
ual formed a corporation to obtain a loan for the purchase of an
aircraft. The corporation obtained the loan and gave the lender a
promissory note and a security interest in the aircraft. The corpora-
tion leased the aircraft to another corporation, received payments un-
der the lease, then authorized the lessee corporation to return the
aircraft so it could be sold. The individual claimed depreciation of the
aircraft and loss from its sale on his tax return. 6' The Fifth Circuit
denied the personal deductions because "the substantial business ac-
tivities" of the corporation brought the case within the purview of
Moline.62
Occasionally the taxpayer prevailed under the disregard theory. Re-
call that in Paymer the court disregarded one of the corporations,
characterizing it as a "passive dummy. ' 63 The taxpayer in Jackson v.
Commissioner64 experienced similar success. In Jackson, corporations
were formed solely to transfer and hold stock of other corporations
partly owned by the taxpayer. This arrangement allowed the taxpay-
er's wife to hold stock free of claims from the taxpayer's creditors. 65
The court likened the case to Paymer and disregarded the corpora-
tions for tax purposes. 66
Despite the successes in Paymer and Jackson, taxpayer arguments
for disregard of nominee corporations failed in the vast majority of
cases. 67 Consequently, most taxpayers turned to the agency theory as
the best strategy for prevailing on the taxability of the corporate nom-
inee.
61. Id. at 1097.
62. Id. at 1100.
63. Paymer v. Commissioner, 150 F.2d 334, 337 (2d Cir. 1945); see also supra notes 56-59
and accompanying text.
64. 233 F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1956).
65. Id. at 289-90.
66. Id. at 291.
67. See, e.g., Taylor v. Commissioner, 445 F.2d 455 (1st Cir. 1971); Carver v. United
States, 412 F.2d 233 (Ct. Cl. 1969); Gregg Co. v. Commissioner, 239 F.2d 498 (2d Cir. 1956),
cert. denied, 353 U.S. 946 (1957); Preferred Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH)
68 (1976); Bolger v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 760 (1973); Love v. United States, 96 F. Supp. 919
(Ct. Cl. 1951).
Other cases in which the taxpayer successfully argued the disregard theory rest on rather weak
rationales. For example, in Baltimore Aircoil Co. v. United States, 333 F. Supp. 705 (D. Md.
1971), and Dobyns-Taylor Hardware Co. v. United States, 278 F. Supp. 538 (E.D. Tenn. 1967),
the courts relied on pre-Moline authority to disregard the corporations. Similarly, in K-C Land
Co. v. Commissioner, 19 T.C.M. (CCH) 183 (1960), the court disregarded the corporation but
relied partly on a case that was subsequently reversed on appeal. Id. at 186. See State-Adams
Corp. v. Commissioner, 32 T.C. 365 (1959), rev'd, 283 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365
U.S. 844 (1961); see also Comment, supra note 36, at 804 n.68 (noting that K-C Land Co. is
probably not good law).
19891
136 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 17:127
B. The Agency Theory
Although the Supreme Court in Moline rejected application of the
agency theory, it hinted in dicta that such a theory could work, 68 and
indeed, in a limited number of early cases, 69 it did. For example, in
Worth Steamship Corp. v. Commissioner,70 pursuant to a written
agreement, three individual joint venturers used a corporation to hold
title to and manage a steamship for which they paid a monthly fee. 7'
The Tax Court attributed the income derived from the operation of
the steamship to the joint venturers, rather than the corporation. The
court emphasized that only two of the venturers held any stock in the
corporation, and that the third venturer had no interest in the corpo-
ration other than having the steamship operated for his own ac-
count.72
In 1949, however, the Supreme Court decided a case in which the
taxpayers had specifically arranged their business affairs in an attempt
to take advantage of an agency relationship, only to find that their
arrangement was unable to protect them from adverse tax conse-
quences. In National Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner,73 three wholly-
owned subsidiary corporations of Air Reduction Corporation (Airco)
entered into an agency contract with the parent corporation, which
sought to avoid the double taxation that would result from operating
through subsidiaries. 4 The agreement provided that Airco would fur-
nish working capital, executive management, and office facilities for
the subsidiaries in exchange for all the profits in excess of six percent
on capitalization. The subsidiaries retained the six percent as a nomi-
nal fee for acting as agent. Airco reported those profits as its own
income and the subsidiaries reported only the six percent fee. 75
The Court rejected the assertion that the subsidiaries were merely
acting as agents, despite the "form of ownership of assets adopted by
68. Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436, 440-41 (1943); see also supra
notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
69. See, e.g., Caswal Corp. v. Commissioner, 19 T.C.M. (CCH) 757 (1960) (corporation
acting as fiduciary was not engaged in any business in its own right); Industrial Union Oil Co. v.
Commissioner, 5 T.C.M. (CCH) 879 (1946) (corporation not taxable on income from oil leases
where corporate resolution provided that it would hold title to oil leases as agent or trustee for
beneficial owner).
70. 7 T.C. 654 (1946).
71. Id. at 659-61.
72. Id. at 665.
73. 336 U.S. 422 (1949).
74. The tax treatment of affiliated corporations has since changed. See I.R.C. § 243(a)(3),
(b) (1988) (allowing deduction for dividends received from affiliated corporation); id. §§ 1501-
1505 (allowing pass-through of losses by consolidated return).
75. National Carbide, 336 U.S. at 424-26.
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Airco and its subsidiaries ' 7 6 and the careful language of the contract.
Rather, the Court determined that income must "be taxed to those
who earn it, despite anticipatory agreements designed to prevent vest-
ing of the income in the earners. ' 77 The Court found that contractu-
ally requiring the subsidiaries to turn over their profits to Airco was
''entirely consistent with the corporation-sole stockholder relationship
whether or not any agency exists. "78
However, the Court did not foreclose the possibility that a true
agency relationship could exist, 79 and its qualifying statements paved
the way for subsequent attempts to tailor an arrangement that would
pass the test. The Court enunciated six factors that became the stand-
ard test for a true agency relationship:
[1] Whether the corporation operates in the name and for the
account of the principal, [2] binds the principal by its actions, [3]
transmits money received to the principal, and [4] whether receipt of
income is attributable to the services of employees of the principal
and to assets belonging to the principal are some of the relevant
considerations in determining whether a true agency exists.... [5]
[Ilts relations with its principal must not be dependent upon the fact
that it is owned by the principal, if such is the case. [6] Its business
purpose must be the carrying on of the normal duties of an agent.80
The Court particularly noted that the "usual incidents of an agency
relationship" referred to in Moline are not present merely because of
an identity of ownership and control. 81
III. POST-NATIONAL CARBIDE CASES
National Carbide created new possibilities for the agency argument,
for it seemed that with the "blessing" of the Supreme Court, those
who carefully structured their business affairs could employ corporate
nominees and still retain the tax benefits of individual ownership.
However, taxpayers soon learned that this was not so easily accom-
plished. In fact, it became almost impossible to meet the National
76. Id. Although each subsidiary held title to its assets and the working capital advanced by
Airco was recorded in the books as accounts payable, the Court found that this did "not make
the income earned by their utilization income to Airco." Id. at 434-35.
77. Id. at 436.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 437.
80. Id. (footnote omitted).
81. Id. at 439.
19891
138 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITYLAWREVIEW [Vol. 17:127
Carbide criteria. As a result, most taxpayers suffered a fate similar to
that of the taxpayers in Given v. Commissioner.8
2
In Given, five individuals bought a commercial building and used
an existing corporation to hold title to protect the asset from any po-
tential complications arising from death or suit against any of the
owners. The corporation had no assets except what the investors had
deposited for the purchase of the building, and the three hundred
shares of the corporation's stock were distributed evenly among the
five contributors. No contracts between the shareholders and the cor-
poration were ever drawn to establish an agency relationship. A year
later, two of the shareholders bought out the interests of the other
three, and the following year the property was sold. During the two-
year period that the corporation held title, it entered into rental con-
tracts with tenants and assumed other duties of a landlord, such as
collecting rent and making repairs and improvements on the prop-
erty.8 3 The Eighth Circuit refused to recognize that the corporation
was acting merely as agent for the shareholders. The court emphasized
that the corporation had engaged in substantial business activity and
that it was acting in the absence of any agreement granting it agency
status. 84
Even where the parties executed a contract of agency and complied
with the terms of the agreement, success for the taxpayer was not
guaranteed. In Harrison Property Management Co. v. United States,85
taxpayers formed a corporation to provide for "efficient management
in the event of the death of one of the individuals ' 8 6 and to facilitate
routine business operations that would otherwise require the signa-
tures of all the owners. The individuals and the corporation entered
into a written agreement in which the corporation would hold title to
certain oil leases strictly for convenience and without any considera-
tion, and which recognized the individuals as the true and beneficial
owners of the property . 7
Although the taxpayers were apparently relying on the agency the-
ory, the court devoted much discussion to the disregard theory and
whether the corporation was a separate taxable entity. The court con-
82. 238 F.2d 579 (8th Cir. 1956).
83. Id. at 580-82.
84. Id. at 582-83. One commentator has suggested that had the parties "entered into a spe-
cific contract of agency with the corporation, adhered closely to its terms, provided for payment
to the corporation of a reasonable management fee, and not maintained identity of corporate
ownership," the case might have been decided differently. Bertane, supra note 27, at 757.
85. 475 F.2d 623 (Ct. Cl. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1130 (1974).
86. Id. at 624.
87. Id. at 624-25.
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cluded that the corporation was a separate taxable entity and rejected
the agency argument as well."8 The court relied on language from Na-
tional Carbide that "the formal designation of 'agency agreement' is
not conclusive" in determining the existence of an agency relation-
ship.8 9 The court emphasized that such an agreement was made only
because the individuals were the corporation's shareholders, and that
"all of the corporation's relations with the beneficial owners of the
managed property were wholly dependent on the fact that they were
the sole shareholders. "90 The court also noted that the fact that the
shareholders received all the profits directly and supplied the corpora-
tion its assets and operating capital was insufficient to create a "true
agency." 91
Relying heavily on Harrison, the court in Collins v. United States92
also found the corporation to be a taxable entity and determined it
was not the agent of the beneficial owners. In Collins, the individuals
formed the corporation to obtain a loan to construct an apartment
complex, as they would have violated state usury laws if they had bor-
rowed as individuals. 93 The documents represented the corporation as
a trustee merely holding title until the property could be reconveyed to
the individuals and specified that the corporation could take action
only when directed by the shareholders. 94
The court first rejected the disregard theory, emphasizing that be-
cause the loan could not have been obtained without the corporation,
it was "more than [just] a business convenience, it was a business ne-
cessity to plaintiffs' enterprise." 95 The court then summarily disposed
of the agency argument, stating little more than that "the facts fail to
meet the test of National Carbide and other cases dealing with the
trustee-agency contention.' '96
With the guidance of National Carbide, it would seem an easy task
to devise a situation that would meet the criteria for an agency rela-
tionship. However, as the courts applied the six-factor test, the fifth
and sixth factors were interpreted first as "crucial'' 97 and later as
88. Id. at 626-27.
89. Id. at 627.
90. Id. at 628.
91. Id. at 628-29 (quoting National Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner, 336 U.S. 423 (1949)).
92. 386 F. Supp. 17 (S.D. Ga. 1974), aff'd, 514 F.2d 1282 (5th Cir. 1975).
93. Id. at 18-19.
94. Id. at 20.
95. Id. at 21.
96. Id. Such abbreviated treatment of the agency argument has caused at least one com-
mentator to question whether the court even understood the argument. See Miller, supra note
34, at 260.
97. Jones v. Commissioner, 640 F.2d 745, 755 (5th Cir. Mar. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
965 (1981).
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"mandatory." 9s As a result, most attempts at agency failed one or
both of these factors. The Fifth Circuit became the source for much
of the authority on the treatment of nominee corporations," and its
interpretation of the National Carbide test made it difficult for any
agency arrangement to survive.
For example, in Jones v. Commissioner,'°° the court applied the six
National Carbide factors to determine that no agency relationship ex-
isted between a controlled corporation and the limited partnership in
which taxpayers were partners. The partnership had been formed to
develop and operate an apartment complex, but when it sought per-
manent financing, the lending institution informed it that state usury
laws would prohibit the loan unless the partnership incorporated.
When the partnership sought interim financing, that bank also in-
sisted that the loan be made to a corporation. 01 The partners formed
the corporation and became the sole shareholders, and the partnership
admitted the corporation as an additional general partner. The corpo-
ration had authority in all matters relating to the construction of the
apartment complex, and title to the property was in the corporation's
name without disclosure of its fiduciary capacity. The corporation re-
ceived thirty percent of the net profits with the remaining seventy per-
cent divided between the remaining partners; however, the
corporation was not to share in any losses. 102 Although the project fell
behind schedule, some apartments were leased. The individual part-
ners reported the losses relating to interest and business expenses, as
well as the rent from the leased apartments, on their tax returns.' 3
The Commissioner asserted that the corporation, rather than the indi-
viduals, was entitled to both the losses and rental income from the
project.,04
Although much of the Tax Court's opinion related to whether the
corporation should be disregarded, the Fifth Circuit correctly per-
ceived that the question at issue in this case was not whether the cor-
poration should be recognized, but whether the "alleged relationship"
of the corporation as an undisclosed general partner of the limited
partnership should be recognized for tax purposes despite legal title
98. Roccaforte v. Commissioner, 708 F.2d 986, 990 (5th Cir. 1983).
99. See Moncrief v. Commissioner, 730 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1984); Roccaforte, 708 F.2d at
986; Jones, 640 F.2d at 745.
100. 640 F.2d at 745.
101. Id. at 747.
102. Id. at 748.
103. Id. at 749.
104. Id. at 750.
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lying in the corporation.105 The court then applied the National Car-
bide factors and determined that the corporation was not acting as
agent for the general partnership. 106
The court found that only the second and fourth factors were satis-
fied. In particular, the court found no evidence of the "crucial" fifth
and sixth factors.'0 7 The court interpreted the fifth factor as requiring
an independent and arm's length relationship and the sixth factor, in
this case, as requiring evidence that "corporate general partners com-
monly take title to real estate without disclosure of any fiduciary ca-
pacity.' 1 08
In Roccaforte v. Commissioner,109 the Tax Court ignored the strong
stand taken by the Fifth Circuit regarding the importance of the fifth
and sixth factors. Rather, the court found that the nominee corpora-
tion was acting as agent for the partnership that wholly owned it be-
cause the arrangement as a whole constituted an agency relationship,
despite its failure to satisfy the fifth factor. 110
The partnership, consisting of thirteen individual investors, formed
the corporation to avoid state usury laws in securing financing for
construction of an apartment complex. A "nominee agreement" be-
tween the partners and the corporation provided that the corporation
would hold title to the property, but emphasized that the partners
were the owners of the property. The corporation agreed to refrain
from engaging in any business activity not authorized by the partner-
ship and to remit all rents and proceeds from the project to partners,
who would reimburse the corporation only for expenses."' A second
document, an "agency agreement," specifically designated the corpo-
ration as agent for the partnership in the apartment complex project.
It also specified that lenders would be informed of the agency ar-
rangement and that the partnership would be liable for any debts or
105. Id. at 750-51. The Fifth Circuit noted that the Tax Court was "understandably misled
because the courts have not sharply distinguished the fictitious entity argument from the agency
argument." Id. at 750 n.9. The Fifth Circuit also noted that even where the relationship is that
of a "controlled corporate general partner to the limited partnership, as opposed to the alleged
agency relationship in National Carbide and Collins, . . . the same standards apply." Id. at 752.
The standards will vary in that the third National Carbide factor is not relevant and that with
respect to the sixth factor, the corporation must function in a manner consistent with the normal
duties of a corporate general partner, as opposed to the normal duties of an agent. Id. at 752
n.ll.
106. Id. at 752-55.
107. Id. at 754-55.
108. Id. at 754.
109. 77 T.C. 263 (1981), rev'd, 708 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1983).
110. Id. at 287.
111. id.
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suits arising out of the project.11 2 Describing itself as a "nominee cor-
poration" engaging in "no activity," the corporation filed federal
corporate income tax returns "but reported no income, losses, assets
or liabilities.""' 3 The partners reported losses from the apartment
complex, and the Commissioner disallowed them.11 4
To determine whether the corporation was an agent of the partner-
ship, the Tax Court reviewed the National Carbide factors. The court
found that five of the six factors were satisfied or inapplicable," 5 but
had to concede that the fifth factor was not: the corporation was de-
pendent on the fact that it was owned and controlled by the partners.
The same investors owned one hundred percent of the corporation's
stock in the same proportion as their original ownership in the part-
nership and the corporation received no fee for its services to the part-
nership. The court concluded from these circumstances that the
partnership had not dealt at arm's length with the corporation." 6
Nonetheless, the court concluded that "the entire substance of the ar-
rangement was one of an agency relationship," noting that the part-
ners sought none of the "traditional insulating benefits of a corporate
shareholder . . . [and were] the true economic owners of the property
with all the risks and benefits attendant thereto." 11 7
The Fifth Circuit reversed, rejecting the Tax Court's application of
the National Carbide test, especially its weighting of the factors."'
The court asserted that both the fifth and sixth factors were "manda-
tory and absolute," and that since the fifth factor required that "a
corporation's 'relations with its principal must not be dependent upon
the fact that it is owned by the principal,"' the corporation was not a
"true nontaxable corporate agent."" 9
In addition to discussing several cases which had previously applied
the National Carbide test,' 20 the court pointed to "strong policy con-
112. Id. at 270.
113. Id. at277.
114. Id. at 278.
115. Id. at 283-87 (finding that factors one, two, four, and six were satisfied, and that factor
three did not apply because an agent would not regularly transmit moneys to the principal during
the ongoing construction and management of this type of project).
116. Id. at 286-87.
117. Id. at 287-88.
118. Roccaforte v. Commissioner, 708 F.2d 986, 986-87, 989 (5th Cir. 1983).
119. Id. at 989-90 (emphasis in original) (quoting National Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner,
336 U.S. 422, 436 (1949)).
120. Id. at 990 (citing Collins v. United States, 386 F. Supp. 17 (S.D. Ga. 1974), aff'd, 514
F.2d 1282 (5th Cir. 1975); Harrison Property Management Co. v. United States, 475 F.2d 623
(Ct. CI. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1130 (1974); Jones v. Commissioner, 640 F.2d 745 (5th
Cir. Mar. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981)).
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siderations" in support of its holding. 121 The court feared that an indi-
vidual could avoid tax liability while displaying nothing more than
characteristics common to all shareholders and corporations. Thus,
the court concluded that the taxpayer must show that an agency rela-
tionship could exist independent of ownership and control of the cor-
poration. 122
In Moncrief v. United States,123 the Fifth Circuit recognized an
agency relationship between a partnership and a nominee corporation.
However, the Fifth Circuit did not retreat from its position in Rocca-
forte. In Moncrief, an individua 24 formed a general partnership with
two others to renovate an office building. To secure immediate fi-
nancing and avoid state usury laws, the partners deeded their interests
in the building to a corporation that was wholly owned by one of the
other partners. After the corporation borrowed the necessary funds, it
conveyed title back to the partnership. The individuals claimed losses
from the office building on their income tax returns and the Commis-
sioner disallowed them for the period during which the corporation
held title to the property. 125
Although the jury found that the corporation had acted as the part-
nership's agent, the district court granted the Commissioner's motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (n.o.v.) on the grounds that
the taxpayers had not sustained their burden of proof on the existence
of an agency relationship. 126 The district court refused to instruct the
jury on the nature of the fifth and sixth factors, but nonetheless relied
on the absence of proof of those two factors in granting the judg-
ment. 1
27
On appeal, the issue before the Fifth Circuit was "whether there
was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that the [corpora-
tion] was the partnership's agent.' '1 28 The court determined that the
district court had committed error in granting judgment n.o.v. based
on its own findings regarding the fifth and sixth factors after refusing
to instruct the jury on their importance. It also found "no evidence in
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. 730 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1984).
124. This partner died duing pendency of the suit and two co-executors were substituted as
parties. Id. at 279 n.2.
125. Id. at 278-79.
126. Id. at 279.
127. Id. at 283.
128. Id. at 282. The court specifically stated that it was restricted from assessing the "cor-
rectness" of the construction of the National Carbide factors in Roccaforte. Id.
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the record to support a conclusion that either of these 'factors' was
unsatisfied." 1 29
Although the Fifth Circuit supported the jury's determination that
an agency relationship existed, it did not depart from its position that
the fifth and sixth factors are mandatory. Rather, it distinguished this
case from Roccaforte on the issue of the critical fifth and sixth fac-
tors.
The court found the fifth factor satisfied because the partnership
did not directly own any of the corporation's stock and the same par-
ties did not own a controlling interest in both the partnership and the
corporation. In addition, no evidence indicated that the taxpayer had
any control over the corporation through its owner. 130 The court also
concluded that the parties had operated at arm's length with each
other.'31
The court found the sixth factor satisfied because the corporation
was formed solely to avoid state usury laws in securing financing, and
nothing indicated that this purpose was "inconsistent with the role of
agent."'13 2 Finally, the court reasoned that the policy consideration ex-
pressed in Roccaforte that "the 'separate entity regime would col-
lapse' if the taxpayer could predicate an agency relationship on
characteristics common to all closely-held corporations" was not rele-
vant in this case.' 33
Moncrief, like other cases where courts have found agency, 134 in-
volved a situation where the corporation was not under the complete
ownership of those claiming it as agent. Because the Fifth Circuit con-
tinued to focus on a narrow interpretation of the fifth factor's re-
quirement that agency "must not be dependent upon the fact that [the
corporation] is owned by the principal,' '135 it seemed unlikely that
such a closely held corporation would survive the National Carbide
test.
129. Id. at 283.
130. Id. at 285. The court cited Raphan v. United States, 3 Cl. Ct. 457, 461-62 (1983), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, 759 F.2d 879 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 843 (1985), in analyzing
the nature of the affiliation between an agent corporation and its principal. The two entities are
affiliated if: 1) the principal owns a controlling interest in the agent, or 2) the same parties own a
controlling interest in both. Moncrief v. Commissioner, 730 F.2d 276, 284 (5th Cir. 1984).
131. Moncrief, 730 F.2d at 285.
132. Id. at 286.
133. Id. (quoting Roccaforte v. Commissioner, 708 F.2d 986, 990 (5th Cir. 1983)).
134. See Raphan v. United States, 759 F.2d 879 (Fed. Cir.) (principal and agent not com-
monly controlled and agency agreement therefore recognized), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 843 (1985);
Carver v. United States, 412 F.2d 233 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (because corporation acted as agent for
partner owning no stock in corporation, it also acted as agent for partnership).
135. National Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner, 336 U.S. 422, 473 (1949).
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Undaunted by the Fifth Circuit's literal interpretation of the Na-
tional Carbide factors, in Ourisman v. Commissioner,'3 6 under facts
very similar to Roccaforte, the Tax Court maintained its position that
the entire substance of the arrangement should dictate the existence of
a true agency relationship. Noting that it was not bound to follow the
Fifth Circuit as the case would go to appeal in either the Fourth Cir-
cuit or District of Columbia Circuit, the Tax Court "carefully reex-
amined" its position but remained unconvinced that it should follow
the Fifth Circuit.'3 7 In Ourisman, a partnership formed a corporation
to avoid state usury laws in securing financing for the construction of
an office building. By corporate resolution the corporation was desig-
nated as agent or nominee for the partnership. The parties also exe-
cuted an agency agreement which provided that the corporation would
hold title to the project solely as nominee. The agreement specifically
stated the partnership was the true and lawful owner.'38 The partners
reported the losses, deductions, and income generated from the pro-
ject on their individual tax returns, and the Commissioner once again
disallowed them. 39
The Tax Court again determined a true agency relationship existed
between the corporation and the partnership, with five of the six fac-
tors met. However, on the controversial fifth factor the court refused
to follow the Fifth Circuit, stating that
[t]he Supreme Court expressly recognized that a corporation could
act as an agent for its owners under certain circumstances and
specified the indicia of a true agency relationship. There is no
indication that the Court intended to deny a corporation the status
of agent for its shareholders in spite of the presence of the indicia of
agency (factors one through four) merely because the agency is to
some extent based upon the shareholders' control of the corporation
(factor. five). . . . When the Supreme Court stated that the
corporation's relations with its principal "must not be dependent
upon the fact that it is owned by the principal," the Court was
merely reiterating its holding in Moline Properties that any such
agency must be proved by "evidence other than the control which
shareholders automatically possess over their corporations." In other
words, the taxpayer must prove that the agency existed
independently of the shareholders' ownership and control.'4
136. 82 T.C. 171 (1984), rev'd, 760 F.2d 541 (4th Cir. 1985).
137. Id. at 185.
138. Id. at 173-74.
139. Id. at 176.
140. Id. at 185-86 (citations omitted).
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The court concluded that even though the corporation acted for no
other principal and performed its services for free, it had acted as the
partnership's agent.'4 1
On appeal, however, the Fourth Circuit declined to adopt the Tax
Court's construction of the fifth factor, choosing instead to follow the
Fifth Circuit's literal interpretation that the fifth factor was manda-
tory. 1 42 Accordingly, the court held that "a corporation may not be a
true nontaxable agent if its relations with its principal are dependent
upon the fact that it is owned by the principal.' 1 43 Conceding that it
would be difficult for a controlled corporation to demonstrate the in-
dependence of the principal, the court ventured that such a showing
was not impossible, citing such factors to consider as the identity of
ownership interests of the agent and its principal, whether the corpo-
ration is specifically limited to act as an agent only for third parties,
whether the agent acts for more than one principal, whether a written
agency contract exists, and whether the corporation collects a fee for
its services as agent.144
While the Tax Court asserted that an agency relationship could be
present in the absence of one factor if the relationship as a whole indi-
cated agency, the Fourth and Fifth Circuits were asserting that all six
factors must be present and given equal weight in making the agency
determination. Ironically, the Fourth and Fifth Circuit's interpreta-
tion only acted to create a "stiper-factor" out of the fifth factor be-
cause it virtually dictated the result of the agency relationship
inquiry. 145 Because the fifth factor made the test outcome determina-
tive, the factors were weighted no more equally under the Fourth and
Fifth Circuits' analysis than they were under the Tax Court's.
IV. NEW LIFE FOR THE AGENCY THEORY
After Roccaforte and Ourisman, the agency argument looked un-
promising for principals who owned nominee corporations, and com-
mentators advised taxpayers to plan accordingly. 46 Workable
141. Id. at 184.
142. Ourisman v. Commissioner, 760 F.2d 541, 547 (4th Cir. 1985).
143. Id. at 547-48.
144. Id. at 548.
145. Note, supra note 24, at 79.
146. See Falk, Nominees, Dummies and Agents: Is It Time for the Supreme Court to Take
Another Look?, 63 TAxEs 725, 729 (1985); Rands, supra note 27, at 703; Note, supra note 24, at
79; Note, Recent Developments in the Federal Tax Law Treatment of Nominee Corporations, 13
FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 361, 386 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Recent Developments]; Note, The Use of
Corporations in Real Estate Transactions: Judicial Acceptance of the Agency Theory, 8 J. CoRP.
L. 361, 383-86 (1983) [hereinafter Note, The Use of Corporations].
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strategies included: (1) using a corporation that is independent of the
principal;1 47 (2) using a corporation without actually transferring the
property to it, granting the lender a mortgage in the property still held
by the principal, and then having the corporation lend the funds to
the principal; 148 and (3) using an S corporation. 49
A. Commissioner v. Bollinger
In addition to the other tax planning strategies, taxpayers could
hold out for a circuit court of appeals that would agree with the Tax
Court. 150 Once a conflict between the circuits arose, the Supreme
Court would be more inclined to grant certiorari. This was just the
situation presented by Commissioner v. Bollinger.5'
1. The Facts of Bollinger
Jesse Bollinger was a real estate developer who either individually
or in partnership with others constructed several apartment complexes
in Kentucky. To obtain financing in compliance with state usury laws,
Bollinger used two nominee corporations to hold title to the proper-
ties. One corporation was owned solely by Bollinger; the other was
owned by Bollinger and the partner in the particular venture for which
that corporation was formed. 152
With each corporation, the parties executed a written agreement
providing that the corporation was acting as agent only to secure tem-
porary and permanent financing for the project.' 53 Bollinger or his
partnerships always regarded themselves as the actual owners of the
properties, 5 4 as did the lending institutions, which required partial
personal guarantees from them. 5
The corporations had no liabilities, assets, employees, or bank ac-
counts, and did not manage any of the buildings once they were
rented. 56 Each partnership managed its own complex and maintained
a separate bank account for receiving rents and paying expenses. 57
147. Falk, supra note 146, at 729; Note, Recent Developments, supra note 146, at 386; Note,
supra note 24, at 79.
148. Falk, supra note 146, at 729-30.
149. Note, The Use of Corporations, supra note 146, at 385-86; see also supra note 28 and
accompanying text.
150. See Falk, supra note 146, at 729; Note, Recent Developments, supra note 146, at 387.
151. 48 T.C.M. (CCH) 1443 (1984), aff'd, 807 F.2d 65 (1986), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 1173 (1988).
152. Id. at 1444-49.
153. Id. at 1447 n.4, 1448.
154. Id. at 1448.
155. Id. at 1449.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1448.
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Bollinger and his partners reported the losses incurred from the con-
struction and operation of the buildings on their individual returns,
and the Commissioner disallowed them, determining that such losses
belonged to the corporation holding title to the property. 58
2. The Tax Court Opinion
True to form, the Tax Court reiterated its position regarding the
six-factor National Carbide test for agency, emphasizing that "[n]o
one factor is mandatory and absolute."' 5 9 Finding the case "indistin-
guishable from Roccaforte and Ourisman," the court similarly deter-
mined that the partnerships rather than the corporations were the
owners of the properties for income tax purposes. 160 The court again
stressed that the corporations were formed solely to obtain financing,
with the partners seeking "none of the traditional insulating benefits
of a corporate shareholder." Since "the indicia of an agency relation-
ship [were] present," the court chose to respect that relationship.'16
3. The Sixth Circuit Affirmance
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court, finding its decision "con-
sistent with the Supreme Court's opinion in National Carbide. ' 162
Criticizing the Fourth Circuit's interpretation in Ourisman as "ex-
alt[ing] form over substance,' ' 63 the Sixth Circuit focused on the sub-
stance of the agency relationship. The court declared that when the
evidence establishes the attributes of an agency and the nominee cor-
poration has acted as would an independent agent which had con-
ducted its affairs at arm's length with the principal, then a true agency
relationship exists.1' The court further opined that the Supreme Court
in National Carbide did not intend to foreclose the possibility of a
158. Id. at 1448-49.
159. Id. at 1450. In a footnote, the court recognized its conflict with the Fifth Circuit. Id.
n.6. The Fourth Circuit had not yet reversed Ourisman.
160. Id. at 1450.
161. Id. at 1452.
162. Commissioner v. Bollinger, 807 F.2d 65, 69 (6th Cir. 1986), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 1173
(1988).
163. Id. The Sixth Circuit cited both Roccaforte v. Commissioner, 708 F.2d 986 (5th Cir.
1983), and Vaughn v. United States, 740 F.2d 941 (Fed. Cir. 1984), as supporting the Commis-
sioner, but quickly disposed of them as being factually distinguishable from the present case.
Bollinger, 807 F.2d at 69 & n.3. In Vaughn, the taxpayer failed to prove that the activities of the
corporation were consistent with those of an agent. The corporation concealed its agency status
from creditors, suppliers and contractors, obtained insurance, assumed full liability for a loan
note, and defended law suits. Thus, it engaged in activities that are not normally the duties of an
agent. Vaughn, 740 F.2d at 946-47.
164. Bollinger, 807 F.2d at 69.
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true agency relationship existing between a nominee corporation and
its owner-principal. 65
4. The Supreme Court Clarifies the Agency Test
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict be-
tween the circuit courts and chose not to debate whether the fifth and
sixth factors were mandatory, but rather to clarify what is required to
satisfy them.' s Although the Court acknowledged the necessity of
"unequivocal evidence of genuineness [of agency] in the corporation-
shareholder context," it refused to "parse the text of National Car-
bide."167
The Commissioner claimed that the principle enunciated in Moline
that a corporation is a separate taxable entity, even if owned and con-
trolled by a single shareholder, would be undermined by anything less
than a "prophylactically clear test of agency.' ' 68 Although the Court
agreed with the principle, it questioned whether the test proposed by
the Commissioner was the appropriate one. 69
The Commissioner claimed that both the fifth and sixth factors
were unsatisfied in this case, and the Court chose to dispose of the
sixth factor first. The Commissioner argued that the corporation was
acting as owner rather than agent in regard to the state's usury laws,
and therefore was not performing a normal duty of an agent. The
Supreme Court disagreed, stating emphatically that the corporation
was not acting as owner since the partners always represented them-
selves as the principals in all loan transactions. 70
The Court declined to impose "a federal tax sanction for the appar-
ent evasion of Kentucky's usury law," observing that the Commis-
sioner had not established that the transactions were an evasion even
of "the spirit of the Kentucky law, much less its letter." '' 71 The Court
reasoned that the use of a corporate nominee is "positively envi-
sioned" by Kentucky's usury law because the statute forbids the use
of a corporation whose only asset is a one- or two-family dwelling. In
165. Id.
166. Commissioner v. Bollinger, 108 S. Ct. 1173 (1988). The Court did, however, character-
ize the factors as "four indicia and two requirements," id. at 1177, which arguably means that
the fifth and sixth factors are in fact mandatory. However, that argument will probably be moot
because of the Court's relaxed interpretation of what is required to satisfy them.
167. Id. at 1179.
168. Id. at 1177.
169. Id.
170. Id at 1178. In fact, the lenders required the use of a corporate nominee, id., so they
obviously knew the corporation was not the real owner.
171. Id.
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other words, the law acknowledges the use of a corporate nominee as
long as it is not merely used to secure a home mortgage. The Court
also noted that under Kentucky's usury laws, only the lender is penal-
ized for usury and the borrower is regarded as the victim. The Court
concluded that "the United States would hardly be vindicating Ken-
tucky law by depriving the usury victim of tax advantages he would
otherwise enjoy.' ' 72 Therefore, the Court found "no basis in either
fact or policy for holding that the corporation was the principal be-
cause of the nature of its participation in the loans."' 73
The Court also rejected the Commissioner's position that the fifth
factor requires nothing less than an arm's length relationship between
the corporate agent and its principal that includes payment of an
agency fee. 74 Conceding that the language of the fifth factor is "not
entirely clear," the Court determined that it was merely "a general-
ized statement of the concern" that closely held corporations should
not be allowed to claim agency status at their convenience to minimize
their tax liability. 75 The Court concluded its discussion by summariz-
ing what is required to ensure that the agency relationship is genuine
and tax avoidance is circumvented:
[1] the fact that the corporation is acting as agent for its shareholders
with respect to a particular asset is set forth in a written agreement at
the time the asset is acquired, [2] the corporation functions as agent
and not principal with respect to the asset for all purposes, and [3]
the corporation is held out as the agent and not principal in all
dealings with third parties relating to the asset. 76
Having determined that "these requirements were met here," the
Court affirmed the judgment of the Sixth Circuit.177
B. Bollinger Applied
Even as the Supreme Court was deciding Bollinger, parties in two
other agency cases petitioned for certiorari. George v. Commis-
172. Id. (citing Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 360.020, .025(2), .990 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
1987)).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1178-79. The Court observed that the law of agency makes no rigid requirements
of "arm's length dealing plus agency fee," and in fact "permits agents to be unpaid family
members, friends, or associates." Id. at 1179 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 16,
21, 22 (1957)).
175. Id. at 1177, 1179.
176. Id. at 1179.
177. Id.
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sioner78 and Frink v. Commissioner7 9 arose out of the same transac-
tion,180 and presented the typical fact pattern found in most of these
agency cases. A partnership wishing to avoid state usury laws in secur-
ing a loan for the construction of a hotel used a corporation that was
wholly owned by one of the partners and his wife. Additional limited
partnership interests were sold, and the partnership entered into a
written nominee agreement with the corporation which provided that
the corporation would only act on behalf of the partnership, with the
partnership indemnifying the corporation for any loss or liability. The
agreement also stated that the corporation held title to the property
for the equitable, legal and beneficial ownership of the partnership.
The agreement did not provide for any compensation, but three years
after the corporation conveyed title to the partnership, the partnership
paid the corporation one hundred dollars for its services.", The part-
ners deducted losses from the project on their income tax returns, and
the Commissioner disallowed them.18 2
Both the Fourth Circuit'83 and the Fifth Circuit'8 4 reversed the Tax
Court's determination that the corporation had acted as agent for the
partnership, following their opinions in Ourisman and Roccaforte re-
spectively. Subsequent to its decision in Bollinger, the Supreme Court
vacated the judgments of the courts of appeals and remanded them
for reconsideration. 8 5
On remand, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court in a rather
terse opinion. 86 Quoting the three-clause statement from Bollinger
laying out the new agency requirements, the court simply said that in
light of this criteria, the test for genuine agency had been met.8 7
In a somewhat more enlightening opinion, the Fifth Circuit likewise
affirmed the Tax Court on remand. 88 Also reviewing the three-part
178. 108 S. Ct. 1264 (1988).
179. 108 S. Ct. 1264 (1988).
180. These cases were part of twenty consolidated docket numbers heard by the Tax Court in
Frink v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 386 (1984). Eighteen of the docket numbers appealed
to the Fifth Circuit in George v. Commissioner, 803 F.2d 144 (5th Cir. 1986) and the remaining
two appealed to the Fourth Circuit in Frink v. Commissioner, 798 F.2d 106 (4th Cir. 1986).
George, 803 F.2d at 145 n.l.
181. Frink, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) at 388-94. The limited partnership entered into a similar
agreement with a second identically owned corporation which had been formed to acquire and
operate a golf course, but the Tax Court found that each corporation had acted in its own name
and for its own account with respect to ownership and operation of the golf course. Id.
182. Id. at 394.
183. Frink v. Commissioner, 798 F.2d 106 (4th Cir. 1986), vacated, 108 S. Ct. 1264 (1988).
184. George v. Commissioner, 803 F.2d 144 (5th Cir. 1986), vacated, 108 S. Ct. 1264 (1988).
185. Frink, 108 S. Ct. at 1264; George, 108 S. Ct. at 1264.
186. Frink v. Commissioner, 846 F.2d 5 (4th Cir. 1988) (per curiam).
187. Id. at 6.
188. George v. Commissioner, 844 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1988).
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Bollinger test, the Fifth Circuit summarized that "when it is clear that
the parties intended that the corporation act only as an agent, there is
no need to make a separate strict inquiry about the extent to which the
agent corporation's status is dependent on the principal's owner-
ship." 9 19
Sundance Ranches, Inc. v. Commissioner90 presented the Tax
Court with its first agency case since the Supreme Court decided Bol-
linger. The case is significant because the Tax Court ended any specu-
lation that Bollinger completely replaced National Carbide.
In Sundance Ranches, the Tax Court rejected the agency claim be-
cause the corporation did not represent itself as agent in dealings with
third parties. In all the sales transactions, the corporation was identi-
fied as owner on warranty deeds and other documents, and several
subdivision reports listed the corporation as "developer." The Tax
Court concluded that
[d]evelopment of property is not among "the normal duties of an
agent"; a developer typically acts for its own account. There is no
evidence in this case that the grantor trust was bound by [the
corporation's] actions; that [the corporation] transmitted more than
a part of the income in question to the grantor trust; or that the
income was attributable to the assets and employees of the grantor
trust. 191
This conclusion, consisting largely of an analysis of the National Car-
bide factors, indicates that National Carbide is still the agency test,
subject to the Bollinger interpretation.
C. Analysis of Bollinger
The three-part Bollinger test, combined with the National Carbide
factors, sets the new standard for an agency relationship to be recog-
nized for tax purposes. Although the danger exists that this new test
will be read as literally as the old one was, 92 principals who carefully
arrange their relationships with their wholly-owned nominee corpora-
tions may now achieve their business purposes while avoiding adverse
tax consequences.
On at least one level, the result in Bollinger makes sense: real estate
developers should not be subject to tax penalties merely because they
189. Id. at 229.
190. 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 695 (1988).
191. Id. at 701.
192. Seto & Glimcher, When Will a Related Corporate Nominee Be a Partnership's Agent?,
68 J. TAX'N 380, 384 (1988).
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comply with state usury laws. As the Supreme Court noted, Bollinger
did nothing illegal in using a corporate nominee to secure the higher
interest rate.' 93 Therefore, it would be unfair to subject developers in
one state to adverse tax treatment because that state allows only cor-
porations to borrow at the higher interest rates, when developers in
another state can secure financing as individuals and thus receive
more favorable tax treatment simply because that state's usury laws
are different. Such a result raises the question of the propriety of al-
lowing state laws to dictate federal income tax policies. The exertion
of Congress' power under the Constitution to tax income "is not sub-
ject to state control. It is the will of Congress which controls, and the
expression of its will in legislation, in the absence of language evidenc-
ing a different purpose, is to be interpreted so as to give a uniform
application to a nationwide scheme of taxation."194 The Bollinger de-
cision lends greater uniformity to the tax treatment of real estate de-
velopers in states which restrict noncorporate lending rates, thus
harmonizing with the principle that "differences in state law should
not override the intent of Congress in enacting federal taxing stat-
utes. "19
One issue left undecided by Bollinger is the limits to which the deci-
sion will extend. Although the result in Bollinger will protect an
agency arrangement where the corporation is used solely to acquire
funding in compliance with state usury laws, what other business pur-
poses it will likewise protect is unclear. Because the agency arrange-
ment now offers more attractive tax benefits, undoubtedly more
taxpayers will make use of it. Therefore, courts will likely examine the
motive behind the use of the corporation and ferret out any tax-avoid-
ance manipulation. ,96
193. See Commissioner v. Bollinger, 108 S. Ct. 1173, 1178 (1988):
[It makes no] sense to adopt a contrary-to-fact legal presumption that the corporation
was the principal, imposing a federal tax sanction for the apparent evasion of Ken-
tucky's usury law. To begin with, the Commissioner has not established that these
transactions were an evasion. Respondents assert without contradiction that use of
agency arrangements in order to permit higher interest was common practice, and it is
by no means clear that the practice violated the spirit of the Kentucky law, much less
its letter.
See also supra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
194. Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 110 (1932) (emphasis added).
195. Vaughn v. United States, 719 F.2d 196, 200 (6th Cir. 1983).
196. See Sundance Ranches, Inc. v. Commissioner, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 695 (1988), discussed
supra notes 190-91 and accompanying text. The Commissioner claimed that the transaction be-
tween the principal and nominee corporation was a "sham transaction, created solely to avoid
income taxes." Id. at 699. Although the court would not hold that the transactions were a sham,
it concluded that they were "mischaracterized for tax purposes." Id. at 701.
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It is also unclear how the courts will determine whether the corpora-
tion is acting as agent or principal. Although the Bollinger test re-
quires the corporation to "function[] as agent and not principal with
respect to the asset,''19 the Court never stated exactly what that en-
tails. Bollinger and the other agency cases seem to suggest that only
when the corporation does not act at all will it be deemed an agent.
This apparent passive activity requirement is so strongly reminiscent
of the disregard theory that it raises the question of whether the two
theories actually are only one. 98 The same activities which would
cause a corporation to satisfy the Moline business purpose or business
activity test could also be characterized as activities of a principal. It
seems that the "agency test" is really saying that when the controlled
corporation does nothing but hold naked legal title, it is "acting" as
agent, but in reality it is not "acting" at all. Thus, when the corpora-
tion is deemed "agent," the court in essence is merely disregarding it.
Perhaps the real lesson that Bollinger teaches is that as long as the
parties do not become too greedy, the courts will allow the parties to
decide who the "owner" of the property is for income tax purposes.
This is not a new theme, as evidenced by the Supreme Court in Frank
Lyon Co. v. United States'" when it held:
[W]here ... there is a genuine multiple-party transaction with
economic substance which is compelled or encouraged by business or
regulatory realities, is imbued with tax-independent considerations,
and is not shaped solely by tax-avoidance features that have
meaningless labels attached, the Government should honor the
allocation of rights and duties effectuated by the parties.20°
Taxpayers no doubt applaud this approach as it allows them some
flexibility in arranging their business affairs. Although the courts will
continue to examine each case individually, 20' the agency theory is
now a viable tax alternative.
V. CONCLUSION
For nearly forty years, the agency theory has been little more than
just that: a theory. The Supreme Court's decision in Commissioner v.
197. Bollinger, 108 S. Ct. at 1179.
198. Indeed, the courts have applied the same analysis to both theories. See, e.g., Bolger v.
Commissioner, 59 T.C. 760 (1973). If passive activity is required, this also helps explain why
courts in the past often confused the two theories. See Jones v. Commissioner, 640 F.2d 745, 751
n.9 (5th Cir. Mar. 1981) ("courts have not sharply distinguished the fictitious entity argument
from the agency argument"), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981).
199. 435 U.S. 561 (1978).
200. Id. at 583-84.
201. Accord Seto & Glimcher, supra note 192, at 385; Frank Lyon Co., 435 U.S. at 584.
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Bollinger has brought new life to the theory by defining standards
which a developer and a closely held corporation can realistically
meet. Had the Court adhered to a literal interpretation of the Na-
tional Carbide factors, it would have surely precluded an agency rela-
tionship from ever being recognized where the agent is a closely held
corporation.
The result in Bollinger brings fairness to a situation that was other-
wise favorable only to developers living in states that did not restrict
noncorporate lending rates. Now developers who must incorporate to
secure financing in compliance with state usury laws can claim the in-
come and deductions arising from their property on their individual
tax returns. As long as developers and their closely held corporations
are careful in arranging their affairs and adhere to the requirements of
National Carbide and Bollinger, their agency relationships will be re-
spected for income tax purposes.

